Abstract. Identity-based cryptography has become extremely fashionable in the last few years. As a consequence many proposals for identitybased key establishment have emerged, the majority in the two party case. We survey the currently proposed protocols of this type, examining their security and efficiency. Problems with some published protocols are noted.
Introduction
One of the main purposes of using public-key cryptography, in comparison to shared-key cryptography, is to make key distribution easier. Public keys by their nature need not be kept confidential. On the other hand, integrity of public keys is critical for security and therefore public key certificates have been used for many years. Management of public key certificates has proven to be a harder task than was initially realised and so new directions have been sought. Identitybased cryptography removes the need for certificates since the identity of the owner is the public key. Such public keys can include any descriptive information including temporal information.
Public key cryptography (and identity-based cryptography in particular) only addresses management of long-term public keys which are not suitable for bulk cryptographic processing. For such purposes symmetric keys are usually required which are established freshly for each individual session. Protocols for establishing such session keys come in many different types and have a reputation for being difficult to design correctly. One of the simplest and most common types of key establishment protocols are key agreement protocols in which the session key is defined by inputs from the protocol participants.
In the past few years there has been extreme interest in the use of identitybased cryptography, mainly due to the use of elliptic curve pairings to realise cryptographic structures that did not seem possible before. Amongst the many resulting new tools that have been proposed have been a large number of key agreement protocols based on pairings. In the rush to exploit the new ideas many of these protocols have been published without a careful security analysis or a systematic comparison with alternatives. The situation is somewhat like that 20 years ago when key establishment protocols for conventional public key cryptography were routinely published without a proper security analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to make a critical appraisal of the current status of identity-based key agreement protocols, limited to the two-party case. We examine the security properties and efficiency achieved in a large number of published protocols. We emphasise the importance of precise security models and note deficiencies in several protocols.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The following section defines the subject matter in more detail by discussing relevant background on identity-based cryptography and key agreement protocols. Section 3 surveys the field of existing published protocols and analyses their comparitive security and efficiency. The conclusion speculates where subsequent progress may be likely.
Identity-based cryptography and key agreement
The original idea for identity-based cryptography goes back to Shamir [30] over 20 years ago. Identity-based cryptography does away with public keys altogether so no certificates are required (although the authenticity of public parameters needs to be assured). This is of great benefit in simplifying key management. However, a drawback of all true identity-based schemes is that users cannot be allowed to generate their own private keys (otherwise anyone could find any user's private key) and therefore key escrow is inevitable.
Shamir gave an algorithm for identity-based signatures but was unable to obtain an identity-based encryption algorithm. However, in 1987 Okamoto [24, 25] published the first identity-based key agreement protocol. It uses a composite modulus n whose factorisation is known only to a trusted authority. The authority chooses values e and d as in the RSA algorithm, so that ed mod φ(n) = 1, and an element g that is primitive in both the integers mod p and the integers mod q. The values g and e are made public.
Before engaging in the key agreement protocol each user must register with the authority to obtain a private key. Party P i 's identification string, ID i , is treated as an integer modulo n. The authority calculates the value s i = ID −d i mod n and distributes s i securely to user I. Once this registration is completed users may agree fresh session keys without recourse to any other information other than the fixed parameters e and n and the identity of the partner with which the key is to be shared.
Protocol 1 shows the key agreement message flows. The shared secret is defined as Z AB = g erArB . On the assumption that it is necessary to know either s A or s B in order to find Z AB , the scheme prevents an adversary from learning the session key. Mambo and Shizuya [22] and later Kim et al. [18] provided a security proof against active attacks. They showed a reduction of attacks on the protocol to the Diffie-Hellman problem or to the RSA problem. Their model is similar to the Bellare-Rogaway security model [3, 4] discussed below. Interest in identity-based cryptography was resurrected when Boneh and Franklin [6] presented the first identity-based encryption scheme using the idea of a bilinear map based on elliptic curve pairings. However, even before this the applications of pairings to identity-based key agreement were recognised by Sakai et al. [29] . Before looking at the SOK protocol we have to introduce some notation and concepts about pairings and bilinear maps. Except where noted otherwise, the following notation is used for all protocols in this paper.
Using the notation of Boneh and Franklin [6] , we let G 1 be an additive group of prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order q. We assume the existence of a mapê from G 1 × G 1 to G 2 . Typically, G 1 will be a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, G 2 will be a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a related finite field and the map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve. The mappingê must be efficiently computable and has the following properties.
Non-degenerate: for some element P ∈ G 1 , we haveê(P, P ) = 1 G2 .
When a ∈ Z q and Q ∈ G 1 , we write aQ for scalar multiplication of Q by a. Due to bilinearity, for any Q, W ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z q we have:
Recent literature [1, 2, 6, 15] provides a more comprehensive description of how these groups, pairings and other parameters should be selected in practice for efficiency and security. A random value s ∈ Z q plays the role of the master secret of the Key Generation Centre (KGC) in the ID-based system. The KGC distributes to each party P i with identity ID i a long-term key pair consisting of public key Q i = H 1 (ID i ) and private key S i = sQ i . Here H 1 is a hash function mapping identities ID i ∈ {0, 1} * onto G 1 . The KGC also publishes the system parameters which include descriptions of the two groups G 1 and G 2 , a point P that generates G 1 , and a master public key sP . SOK Protocol [29] . With the above parameters, any two principals P i , P j with identities ID i , ID j can efficiently calculate a shared key:
This protocol for identity-based, non-interactive key distribution is analogous to static Diffie-Hellman but does not require certificates. Dupont and Enge [14] analysed the security of the protocol. Like many identity-based protocols, the security of SOK relies on the difficulty of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). Given G 1 , G 2 andê as above, the BDHP is to computeê(P, P ) xyz ∈ G 2 given P, xP, yP, zP with P ∈ G 1 and x, y, z ∈ Z q .
At this point it is reasonable to ask what advantage there is in identitybased key agreement based on pairings in comparison with older identity-based protocols such as Okamoto's (Protocol 1 above). Generally the answer may be expected to be the same advantages as using elliptic curves over older public key technology, namely a saving in computation and key size. This is certainly true with regard to savings in bandwidth since message exchanges can be considerably shorter. However, it may not necessarily be the case in terms of computation because the pairing operation can be quite costly. Research is still quite active in deciding how to implement pairings most efficiently. In Section 3.2 we compare the efficiency of many pairings-based key agreement protocols. Another reason for choosing pairings-based key agreement is to exploit the infrastructure for identity-based cryptography with its many other benefits. In the remainder of this paper we look only at pairings-based key agreement.
Security Properties for Key Agreement
There are many properties that are required for security of any key agreement protocol. These have been discussed by many authors and we refer to the paper of Blake-Wilson and Menezes [5] for an excellent overview. The most basic property is that a passive adversary eavesdropping on the protocol should be unable to obtain the session key. In a modern context we usually require that, far from obtaining the whole key, the adversary cannot even reliably distinguish between the session key and a randomly chosen string of the expected length. We also generally expect the adversary to be an active one, not only able to see all messages sent, but also able to alter, delete and fabricate messages -in short the adversary is in control of the communications on the network. A number of typical attacks lead to additional security properties as follows.
Known key security. It is often reasonable to assume that the adversary will be able to obtain session keys from any session different from the one under attack. A protocol has known-key security if it is secure under this assumption. This is generally regarded as a standard requirement for key establishment protocols. Unknown key-share security. Sometimes the adversary may be unable to obtain any useful information about a session key, but can deceive the protocol principals about the identity of the peer entity. This can result in principals giving away information to the wrong party or accepting data as coming from the wrong party. Consequently security against unknown key-share attacks is regarded as a standard requirement. Forward secrecy. When the long-term key of an entity is compromised the adversary will be able to masquerade as that entity in any future protocol runs. However, the situation will be even worse if the adversary can also use the compromised long-term key to obtain session keys that were accepted before the compromise. Protocols that prevent this are said to provide forward secrecy. Since there is usually a computational cost in providing forward secrecy it is sometimes sacrificed in the interest of efficiency. Forward secrecy for identity-based protocols is similar to conventional public key cryptography. However, there is an additional concern since the master key of the KGC is another secret that could become compromised. When this happens it is clear that the long-term keys of all users will be compromised, but it is possible that a protocol can provide forward secrecy in the usual sense but still give away old session keys if the master key becomes known.
We will say that a protocol that retains confidentiality of session keys even when the master key is known provides KGC forward secrecy. Key Compromise Impersonation Resistance. Another problem that may occur when the long-term key of an entity A is compromised is that the adversary may be able to masquerade not only as A but also to A as another party B. Such a protocol is said to allow key compromise impersonation.
Resistance to such attacks is often seen as desirable. Another property that is sometimes desired is deniability, which ensures that the protocol does not permit a proof that any particular principal took part. Resistance to key compromise impersonation seems to conflict with deniability [7] .
Although the informal security properties just discussed are useful concepts in assessing protocols, the modern view is that a formal analysis is a more reliable way to obtain confidence in the security of a protocol. The computational approach to proofs of protocols for key establishment was established by Bellare and Rogaway [3, 4] . Several variants and extensions of the model have been used. Here we outline the basic method. The adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that controls all the communications that take place between all protocol principals. It does this by interacting with a set of oracles, each of which represents an instance of a principal in a specific protocol run. Each principal has an identifier U and oracle Π s U represents the actions of principal U in the protocol run indexed by integer s. Interactions with the adversary are called oracle queries. We now describe each one informally.
Send(U, s, m) This query allows the adversary to make the principal U run the protocol normally. The oracle Π s U will return to the adversary the same next message that an honest principal U would if sent message m according to the conversation so far. Reveal(U, s) This query models known key security. If a session key K s has previously been accepted by Π s U then it is returned to the adversary. An oracle is called opened if it has been the object of a Reveal query.
Corrupt(U, K) This query models insider attacks and unknown key share attacks by the adversary. The query returns the oracle's internal state and sets the long-term key of U to be the value K chosen by the adversary. The adversary can then control the behaviour of U with Send queries. A principal is called corrupted if it has been the object of a Corrupt query. Test(U, s) Once the oracle Π s U has accepted a session key K s the adversary can attempt to distinguish it from a random key as the basis of determining security of the protocol. A random bit b is chosen; if b = 0 then K s is returned while if b = 1 a random string is returned from the same distribution as session keys. This query is only asked once by the adversary.
The security of the protocol is defined by a game played between the adversary and a collection of user oracles. The adversary will interact with the oracles through the queries defined above. At some stage during the execution a Test query is performed by the adversary. The target oracle for the test query (and any partner it has) must not have been the subject of a Reveal or Corrupt query. Eventually the adversary outputs its guess (a bit) indicating whether the input to the Test query was the real key or not. Success of the adversary A is measured in terms of its success in getting this guess correct. Definition 1. A protocol P is a secure key establishment protocol if:
-in the presence of a benign adversary partner oracles accept the same key.
-no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can win the above game with probability significantly more than 1 2 . Security of a protocol is typically proved by finding a reduction to some well known computational problem whose intractability is assumed. The formal definition of security in the computational models captures most of the attacks mentioned above. Some model variants do not consider forward secrecy, while resistance to key compromise impersonation is usually not modelled.
An example
In this section we look at a specific protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo [27] . This should help to understand the typical structure of identity-based key agreement and illustrate some of the important properties. Figure 2 describes the protocol. Parties A and B choose random values a and b and exchange ephemeral public keys T A and T B which are used to form the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key abP in group G 1 . They are also assumed to know each other's identity and can therefore both form the long-term shared keyê(Q A , Q B ) s exactly as in the SOK protocol. At the end of the protocol execution, both A and B will compute session keys of the same value:
Protocol 2: Ryu-Yoon-Yoo ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol
A Key Replicating Attack We now describe a new attack in which the adversary succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session, S, (other than the Test session or its matching session) that has the same key as the Test session. In this case the adversary can distinguish whether the Test-session key is real or random by asking a Reveal query to the oracle associated with S. Such an attack has been dubbed a key replicating attack by Krawczyk [19] . The attack succeeds if the adversary is allowed to ask a Reveal query, as shown in tocol execution, but have accepted the same session key. This session key is K AB = H(A, B, abeP,ê(Q A , Q B ) s ) = K BA , depends on e, an input from A. This is a violation of the "key integrity" property [16] which states that any accepted session key should depend only on inputs from the protocol principals. Since both A and B do not have any matching conversations (they are not partners since their protocol views are different), A is able to trivially expose a fresh session key by revealing either A or B.
Key Compromise Impersonation In order to demonstrate that the Ryu-YoonYoo protocol does not achieve key compromise impersonation resilience (as claimed), we assume that the adversary, A, has corrupted player A (using a Corrupt query) and has knowledge of the long-term secret key of A, sQ A .
A impersonates B and starts a new protocol execution with A. At the end of this protocol execution, A is able to compute the session key of A as per protocol specification, as shown below:
Comparing identity-based key agreement protocols
In this section we survey a large number of protocols that have been published in the recent literature and assess their security and efficiency. Most of the protocols are defined using two message flows, one in each direction between principals A and B. There have been some one-way protocols proposed [26] but we will not look at these in this survey. Many protocols are also defined in a three message version, typically by adding a "handshake" between the parties to provide confidence that they both hold the same key. We note that there are many similarities between identity-based key agreement and key agreement using standard public key cryptography. Arguably the aim in designing a good ID-based key agreement protocols is to achieve all the properties of the best conventional key agreement protocols but without the need for certified public key, and at the same time trying to maximise efficiency. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the definition of each of the protocols. Those in Table 1 use unauthenticated messages, which means that private keys are not used in their construction. In contrast protocols in Table 2 include some direct authentication information, which is checked by the recipient before proceeding. There are three ingredients which essentially define most of these protocols.
Protocol Definitions
Private key Most protocols use the private key construction used in the first protocol of Sakai et al. which we denote Type I. There are to date a few examples of protocols using an alternative key first suggested by Sakai and Kasahara [28] which we denote Type II.
-Type I: S U = sQ I -Type II: S U = (s + q U ) −1 P Note that Type I private keys are members of the elliptic curve group G 1 defined by mapping the identity string ID I of entity I to the value Q I using a suitable hash function. Boneh and Franklin [6] suggest an explicit function for a particular elliptic curve which costs one exponentiation in the underlying field. This mapping must also be applied to find the public key Q I . In contrast Type II private keys use a value q U which is a hash of ID U whose output is a scalar in Z q . The corresponding public key for the Type II private key is (s + q U )P which can be calculated as sP + q U P . Finally there is a variant of Type II which we denote II'. Type II' keys are defined using a different pairing and use two different public generators P and Q for the inputs of the pairing. Message structure In order to obtain the best efficiency most protocols send only one message block typically consisting of one elliptic curve point. Some protocols add a second value which can typically be considered as a signature value which is checked by the recipient before the session key is computed. Session key construction There are many different ways that the exchanged messages can be combined in order to derive the session key. Each party uses the received message together with its private long-term key and its short-term random input.
Protocol Private key Message Session key Smart [32] Type I TA = aPê(SA, TB) ·ê(SB, TA)
abP ) Yi [36] Type I WAê((a + (WA)x)QA, (b + (WB)x)QB) Table 1 . Summary of unauthenticated two-message ID-based protocols Protocols in Table 1 are simple enough that it is possible to reconstruct each one from the summary information. In each protocol the message shown is that sent by A. The corresponding message sent by B is symmetrical. In each protocol A computes a random ephemeral private key a which is a scalar in Z q . In protocols which use a Type I key exchange, messages are either of the form T A = aP , or of the form W A = aQ A , or both. Protocols with keys of Type II or II' exchange messages of the form R A = aQ B where B is the other party. The session key is shown in the table in symmetrical format which does not show directly how it is constructed. H denotes some secure hash function; denote concatenation of two messages. In Wang's protocol ψ A = π(W A , W B ), where π :
a special hash function, and h is the co-factor of the elliptic curve defining G 1 . In Yi's protocol, (W A ) x denotes the x-coordinate of point W A .
Protocol Private key Messages Session key KRY [17] Type I TA, H(TA)SA + a · sPê(P, P ) abs CJL [12] #1 Type I asP, aSA H(absP QA QB) BMP [7] Type I aP (authenticated) H(abP ) CHLS [11] Type II See text H(g a , b, . . .) Table 2 . Summary of authenticated two-party, two-message ID-based protocols Protocols in Table 2 include direct authentication information as a signature of some sort. The first two protocols in this table are symmetrical and use messages as shown. The BMP protocol [7] is the only protocol shown that exists only in a 3-move version. This protocol provides direct authentication of the ephemeral keys aP and bP . The CHLS protocol [11] is specially designed for use by a client of low computational power and consequently its structure is very different from the other protocols listed. Essentially the client sends an encrypted and signed secret value g a which can be recovered and authenticated by the server. The server sends its input b in cleartext and both parties can then compute the session key as a hash of g a , b and other values. There are some interesting comparisons possible between the protocols seen in Table 1 and various protocols using conventional Diffie-Hellman in finite fields. For example, the RYY protocol has strong similarities to the so called Unified Model protocol which is included in the IEEE P1363 standard. There is a close similarity also between the Yi protocol and the MQV protocol. Finally the CK protocol is closely related to MTI A(0) protocol. (Blake-Wilson and Menezes [5] include descriptions of each of these protocols.) These similarities may extend to the security properties of these protocols, though this is currently unproven.
Some protocols include versions that can work with different domains in which separate KGCs use different master keys. These include the CK, MB, and Xie protocols. A protocol of Lee et al. [20] (not included in the table) is essentially the same as the CK protocol extended to domains in which different groups are used. Table 3 summarises the computation of each party. We only record multiplications and pairings in group G 1 , and exponentiations from G 2 . For simplicity we equate exponentiations in G 2 with multiplications in G 1 and add them to the total for M , while the pairings are denoted P .
Protocol efficiency
Computational requirements are divided into two parts, online and offline. The offline computations are those that can be computed before the protocol run starts. We have counted as offline those computations that require knowledge of the identity of the peer. This may not always be realistic. Some computations are also independent of the peer's identity. For the CHLM protocol the computation is different for the client (shown first) and the server (shown second).
Protocol Computation Computation
On-line Off-line Smart [32] 1P 2M + 1P CK [9] #1' 1M + 1P 2M + 1P CK [9] #2 1P 2M CK [9] #2' 1M + 1P 2M Wang [34] 2M + 1P 1M Yi [36] 2M 1M + 1P RYY [27] 1M 1M + 1P KRY [17] 2M + 3P 3M CJL [12] 1M + 1P 1M BMP [7] 1M 2M + 1P CHLS [11] 0/(2P + 2M ) 4M /0 Table 3 . Computational requirements for two-party, two-message ID-based protocols
The amount of communication bandwidth required in each protocol can be estimated by looking at the messages sent in Tables 1 and 2 . Well known techniques for elliptic curve point compression allow points to be expressed as an element in the underlying field plus a single bit. The bandwidth used is considerably less than the RSA-based Protocol 1 if only one point is sent. Protocols that require online pairings computation may be rather inefficient since a pairing requires several times the computation of an elliptic curve multiplication. However, the exact computation required varies considerably depending on the choice of curve and various implementation details. Research is continuing in this area [1] .
Most protocol descriptions ignore the cofactor that may be required to ensure that the point sent is a member of the prime order subgroup. Such a check may be important for security reasons (to avoid small subgroup attacks such as those by Lim and Lee [21] ). However, when the received point is used in a pairing the effort required to check that the point is in G 1 is only a small part of the overall computation required.
Protocol security
We now look at the security of these protocols. Table 4 notes whether each protocol provides forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resistance (KCIR) and has a security proof. Most proofs have been attempted in the BellareRogaway (1993) model [3] . However, some of the original proofs have run into trouble and the table shows that many protocols have proofs only in a restricted form in which the adversary is prevented from asking any Reveal queries.
The CHLS and Wang protocols have proofs in the (full) Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model [3] while the BMP protocol has a proof in the Canetti-Krawczyk model [8] . The CK and BMP protocols are proven secure based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption while the Wang protocol is proven secure using a stronger decisional version of BDH (i.e., DBDH). The security of the Xie and MB protocols assumes the intractability of the Bilinear Inverse DiffieHellman (BIDH) problem, which has been proven to be polynomial time equivalent to the BDH problem [37] . The CHLS protocol is based on two assumptions: the modified BIDH with k values (k-mBIDH) and the Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (k-CAA), which are stronger than the BDH assumption.
Protocol
Fwd. Secrecy KCIR Security proof Smart [32] No Yes No CK #1' [9] Yes Yes No CK #2 [9] No Yes Restricted (BDH) CK #2' [9] No Yes Restricted (BDH) Wang [34] No Yes Yes (DBDH) Yi [36] Yes Yes No RYY [27] No [7] Yes No Yes (BDH) CHLS [11] No Yes Yes (k-mBIDH & k-CAA) Table 4 . Security properties for two-party, two-message ID-based protocols Krawczyk [19] has pointed out that there is a generic attack against forward secrecy on any two-party two-flow protocol for which the messages are not explicitly authenticated. In this attack the adversary first masquerades as A, generates the first protocol flow, and records the reply of B. Later, the adversary can corrupt A and compute the old key in the same way as A would have. The existence of such an attack means that none of the protocols in Table 1 can provide forward secrecy. We have taken a more relaxed view of this (as have most authors) and assume that key confirmation will follow which prevents this attack. Note, however, that in most cases there is no proof of forward secrecy.
The key replicating attacks noted for CJL protocols 1 and 2 are similar to that on the RYY protocol described in Section 2.2. As in that case, it is possible to fix this problem by adding a session identifier (the concatenation of the exchanged messages) into the definition of the session key [13] .
It is clear from Table 4 that there is a significant lack of ID-based protocols with a full security proof. Understanding of the pitfalls and problems has advanced recently and progress in this area can be anticipated soon.
Conclusion
Our survey of two-party identity-based key agreement has shown that there are many protocols which have not received adequate scrutiny. Most published protocols do not carry a security proof so that we cannot be sure what their security properties are -our examples show that they may not be as secure as we may like. We urge caution when proposing new protocols, particularly to ensure that a formal security statement is provided with adequate proof, and also that comparison with the many existing protocols is made. Analogies with previously published protocols with well-proven properties may prove useful.
It is still not clear which is the best protocol for a particular application, nor what are the limitations against further improvement. Some of the protocols that look best from the performance and informal analysis are currently lacking a security proof. Another trend to look out for is proofs in the standard model -currently all the proofs that exist rely on random oracles.
In addition to two-party protocols, tripartite and multi-party identity-based key agreement protocols are currently being widely proposed. The correct security model in these cases is even more uncertain but we can expect useful progress in this area in line with the recent advances in security proofs for multi-party key agreement with conventional public key cryptogaphy.
